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Ontological and Epistemological Reflexivity: A Core Skill for Therapists 
Carla Willig  
City, University of London 
 
This paper develops the argument that a core skill needed to be an effective therapist is to 
have acquired an awareness of one’s own ontological and epistemological position in 
relation to one’s work as a therapist. In the same way that researchers need to develop 
reflexive awareness of their assumptions about what there is to know (ontology) and how 
they can come to know about it (epistemology), therapists need to be aware of their 
fundamental assumptions about human beings and the world they live in (ontology) as well 
as their beliefs about how best to develop an understanding of their clients and the 
meaning(s) of their experiences (epistemology).   
Regardless of which particular therapeutic model is adopted, the language used to talk 
about (and in) therapy, the kinds of questions asked of clients and the 
comments/interpretations offered, all presuppose and reinforce particular versions of 
human being and experiencing which are themselves not usually questioned or challenged 
during the course of therapy.  In this paper it will be argued that it is essential that 
therapists are aware of their own fundamental assumptions about what it means to be 
human, and that they recognise their ontological and epistemological positions as positions 
that they are taking (rather than perceiving them to be self-evident truths). This is important 
for two reasons: i) if clients do not share the therapist’s assumptions (ie. their ‘model of the 
person’), the therapeutic work cannot proceed and be effective; ii) without such an 
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awareness, therapists are at risk of unwittingly imposing their own model of the person 
upon the client which raises ethical issues.  
Key words: ontological and epistemological assumptions; model of the person; therapist 
reflexivity; ‘vocabulary for action’ 
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Self-knowledge is generally understood as an important requirement for those wishing to 
practise counselling and/or psychotherapy (McLeod, 1998). Many training programmes 
expect trainees to engage in personal therapy to develop a deeper understanding of 
themselves , and the role of their personal history in shaping them.  Self-knowledge is seen 
as important because therapists need to recognise their own responses to clients’ material 
and to ensure they remain open to their clients’ experience in all its otherness rather than 
subsuming it into their own life-world or projecting their own thoughts and feelings onto 
their clients.  Self-knowledge also helps therapists engage in appropriate and timely self-
care, and reduces their risk of practising unethically.   
In this paper I argue that ontological and epistemological reflexivity constitute 
neglected dimensions of self-knowledge and that such reflexivity ought to be considered a 
core skill for therapists.  Just as researchers need to develop reflexive awareness of their 
assumptions about what there is to know (ontology) and how they can come to know about 
it (epistemology) (Willig, 2012a), therapists need to be aware of their fundamental 
assumptions about what it means to be human (ontology) as well as their beliefs about how 
best to develop an understanding of their clients (epistemology). Otherwise the therapist 
will not   be mindful of any differences between their own and their client’s fundamental 
assumptions about what it means to be human and the implications of this for their views 
on how best to develop an understanding of the client’s distress. This could have negative 
consequences for the quality of the relationship between client and therapist and may 
compromise their working alliance and thus have a negative impact on the therapeutic work 
(Ardito & Rabellino, 2011). Any agreement on the goals of the therapeutic work as a whole, 
the tasks that need to be completed in each session to move closer to that goal, and the 
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establishment of an emotional bond between client and therapist (the three components of 
the working alliance) presupposes that client and therapist share assumptions about the 
nature of human being and experiencing. If they do not, this will need to be negotiated as 
the therapeutic work proceeds (assuming the client returns after the initial session). If 
therapists are not reflexively aware of their own ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, they risk  missing this opportunity for joint reflection and may alienate the 
client in the process. 
Despite some very insightful reflection on this and related issues (Christopher, 1996; 
McLeod, 1998; Rennie, 1998; Harland et al. 2009; Read et al. 2017; Van Deurzen, 1988), 
epistemological and ontological reflexivity do not feature prominently in counsellor and 
psychotherapy training syllabi. This paper seeks to address this issue by making the case for 
a more explicit engagement with epistemology and ontology within the context of 
counselling and psychotherapy training and practice.  
 
Ontology and Epistemology 
The terms ontology and epistemology are variously defined in dictionaries and textbooks. 
However, the definitions provided share key features which characterise these constructs, 
as follows: 
Ontology 
Ontology is concerned with what exists. It can be described as a theory of being in that it 
attempts to elucidate what it means for something to exist, to ‘be there’. Ontology also asks 
questions about what kinds of things exist and make up the world. A person’s ontology 
identifies the things they assume exist. Every theory is based on an ontology because every 
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theory presupposes that certain entities or processes exist. Ontology refers to the taken-for-
granted upon which we build our understanding of the world.   
 
Epistemology 
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge- its possibility, its scope, its limits 
and the processes by which it can (or cannot) be acquired. It addresses questions about 
what characterises actual knowledge (as opposed to beliefs or ideas about something), 
about what can be known, how we acquire knowledge and how certain we can be about its 
validity or truth value. All claims to knowledge are based on epistemological assumptions 
regarding the nature of knowledge and how true knowledge can be produced; in other 
words, all claims to knowledge are supported by a theory of knowledge. 
 
Ontological and Epistemological Reflexivity in Counselling and Psychotherapy 
All models of counselling/psychotherapy contain ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. McLeod (1998) notes that whilst on the surface approaches to counselling/ 
psychotherapy may appear to simply represent different sets of strategies for helping 
people, “[U]nderneath that set of practical procedures (…) each approach represents a way 
of seeing people, an image of what it is to be a person” (p.27). To illustrate this, we shall 
take a closer look at the three models of practice included in all  training programmes in the 
UK 1.: 
                                                          
1 The purpose of this presentation of models is to demonstrate that all models are 
underpinned by assumptions; I am aware that some readers may take issue with my rather 
simplistic characterisation of some of the models. 
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The Psychoanalytic Model. The psychoanalytic model works with the notion of a split self 
and presupposes the existence of a psyche containing both conscious and unconscious 
realms, thus constructing the person as driven by often unconscious desires, as anxious and 
defended, conflicted and dynamic (ontology). It assumes that knowledge about a client’s 
psychodynamics can be obtained by accessing unconscious content through interpreting the 
client’s material and bring to light its deeper meanings and motivations (epistemology). As a 
result, the client acquires a better understanding of themselves and their motivations, and 
this can help them find more effective ways of having their needs met and develop more 
satisfying relationships. 
 
The Person-centred Model. The person-centred model constructs the person as striving to 
fulfil two primary needs: i) the need for self-actualisation, and ii) the need to be loved and 
valued; and assumes that every person has the potential to express their true self given the 
right condition (ontology). It proposes that knowledge and understanding of the true self 
can be obtained by creating core conditions (including acceptance, congruence and 
empathy) which facilitate the expression of the client’s true self (epistemology) which will 
reduce the client’s psychological distress. 
 
The CBT Model. Using information-processing metaphors, cognitive models construct a 
version of the person as comparable to a computer; akin to a piece of hardware that has the 
potential to be programmed in different ways with different experiential and behavioural 
consequences (ontology). The systematic identification of dysfunctional, maladaptive and 
often automatic thoughts (such as overgeneralisations, dichotomous thinking, or 
personalisation) allows the therapist to access the ‘faulty’ programme (epistemology). 
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Reprogramming the client takes place through techniques such as psychoeducation, thought 
experiments, and reframing, the result of which is to change the way the person 
conceptualises their experiences and consequently how they feel and behave. 
Ontological and epistemological assumptions do not only characterise mainstream 
approaches to counselling and psychotherapy. Recent approaches informed by social 
constructionism which challenge the notion of the individual as the source and locus of 
distress have their own  foundations. For example, systemic family therapy is based on the 
premise that an individual’s distress is a manifestation of something happening between 
members of the family group (ontology) and that it can best be understood by focusing on 
the system (‘the family’) that has produced it (epistemology). Social constructionist 
narrative therapy takes as its starting point the idea that people’s understanding of 
themselves (that is, the stories they tell about themselves) are shaped by the dominant 
narratives available in the surrounding culture (ontology) and that to bring this process to 
light, client and therapist need to externalise the client’s problem (recognise its storied 
origin) and deconstruct the dominant narrative that underpins it (epistemology). 
Taking a closer look at a psychotherapeutic model’s ontology and epistemology 
highlights the generativity of theory and shows how each model constructs its own version 
of human nature and therapeutic change. McNamee (2004) draws attention to the way in 
which adopting a theoretical perspective provides us with a ‘vocabulary for action’ which 
invites certain ways of thinking and acting. Different models of therapy enable different 
ways of relating to oneself and others, and allow different experiential life worlds to 
emerge. By foregrounding a model’s ontology and epistemology we draw attention to its 
productive capacity and its role in creating experiential and social realities.  
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Reflexive awareness of the generativity of one’s working model(s) ought to be 
considered a core skill for therapists because our preferred construction of what it means to 
be a person (ontology) shapes the type of self-understanding we seek and which  
interpretations of our experience are  be open to (epistemology). Regardless of which 
particular therapeutic model is adopted, the language used to talk about (and in) therapy, 
the kinds of questions asked of clients and the comments/interpretations offered, all 
presuppose and reinforce particular versions of human being and experiencing.  
I want to reflect on the ways in which such ontologies and the epistemological 
assumptions that support them inform psychotherapeutic practice and argue that it is 
essential that therapists are aware of their own fundamental assumptions about what it 
means to be human, and recognise their ontological and epistemological positions as 
positions (rather than perceiving them to be self-evident truths). This is important for two 
reasons: i) if clients do not share the therapist’s assumptions (their ‘model of the person’), 
the therapeutic work cannot proceed and be effective due to an underlying philosophical 
incompatibility between client and therapist’s  worldviews (see McLeod, 1998, p. 28; Van 
Deurzen, 1988, p.1) ; ii) without such an awareness, therapists may unwittingly impose their 
own model of the person upon the client. This raises ethical issues because the client may 
be socialised into the therapist’s model without this being acknowledged. It may, of course, 
be helpful for the client to embrace a different view of their humanity as this may allow 
them to approach themselves with more acceptance and compassion, and thus decrease 
their distress (in a sense, this is what therapy is all about, and a client who seeks out a 
therapist is asking to be affected by the therapist’s presence and input). However, given the 
power imbalance between client and therapist, there is a real danger of the therapist’s 
model of the person being imposed upon the client. Therefore,  the therapist’s reflexive 
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awareness of their ontological and epistemological assumptions is an essential part of 
ethical practice (McLeod, 1998; Friedman, 1982; and Willig, 2012b).  
 
Ontological and Epistemological Reflexivity in Action 
I suspect that as therapists we choose our preferred model of practice based on the extent 
to which it corresponds to  our pre-existing understanding of what it means to be a person; 
that is, our ontological commitments. Our chosen model speaks to us because it fits with 
our existing beliefs about human nature and/or because it offers a construction which 
resonates with the questions and thoughts we may be grappling with in relation to the 
human condition.  
 
Reflections on my own position 
I remember becoming acutely aware of the strength of my own deeply held beliefs about 
these matters when working with a client who constructed herself as a split subject in our 
sessions. The client stressed her lack of conscious awareness of what she felt or desired (“I 
don’t know what I want”; “I don’t know what I feel”). At the same time, she reported 
experiencing strong feelings of anger and sadness which she described as “unjustified” or 
“unreasonable” and presented as not belonging to her conscious self (“that’s not me”). 
When I invited her to explore the meanings of her experience, she often reminded me that I 
was the therapist and expressed a desire for me to reveal her true self to her. 
In our sessions, our different conceptualisations of what it meant to be (or have) a 
self, emerged. My client constructed herself as an enigma, a puzzle or problem to be solved 
by me, her therapist.  I rejected the role of the expert, inviting my client to explore her 
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thoughts and feelings and give meaning to her experiences. I encouraged my client to reflect 
on her construction of a split self, how this positions her, what she gains from it, how it may 
limit her experience and what it means for our relationship. When confronted with the 
differences between my client’s and my perspective on her situation, it became apparent 
that my own model of the person (strongly influenced by my reading of existential 
philosophy and its application to psychotherapeutic practice2) was informing my 
interventions and my expectations of my client. I realised that my commitment to the idea 
that meaning must be made by the individual in and through his/her own struggle with the 
human condition (having been, as Heidegger described it, “thrown into the world”) meant 
that I saw it as the client’s responsibility to make sense of herself and her experiences 
(albeit with the help of being in conversation with an empathic and concerned other). In our 
work together, I assumed my client had a choice about how to relate to herself and to 
others, and I interacted with her in a way that positioned her as the author of her life story. 
Explicit positioning 
A therapist’s ontological and epistemological assumptions inform their practice both 
explicitly and implicitly. Explicitly, they can be declared via a therapist’s chosen label (for 
example, by referring to themselves as a ‘person-centred therapist’ or ‘cognitive-
                                                          
2 An existential approach to psychotherapy/counselling starts from the premise that human 
beings are “condemned to be free”(Sartre, 2003, p. 462), and that the human condition is 
characterised by the agonised awareness of its own freedom and responsibility to make life 
meaningful for itself (ontology). Giving meaning to one’s existence requires interpretation 
and that means making choices and taking responsibility for those choices; a never-ending 
process which each person has to engage in (epistemology).  
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behavioural practitioner’) and/or they can be outlined in a descriptive statement of their 
chosen model of practice (for example on their webpage or during the first session with a 
client). Explicit declarations also feature when interpretations or explanations of the client’s 
experience and behaviour are informed by the theoretical premises of the therapist’s model 
of practice.  Here are two examples of therapists’ introducing themselves and their 
approach (taken from the website of a provider of counselling and psychotherapy in the 
UK): 
Example 1: 
I like to consider people from the perspective of words and language. The stories 
that we tell ourselves and the ways we narrate our own lives can be incredibly 
liberating…or painfully constraining. We can all too easily find ourselves at the wrong 
end of punishing self-talk, and the words we use—whether spoken or thought—can 
have an extraordinary power over us. Left unchecked, the weight of all those self-
imposed expectations can lead to a debilitating sense of distress.  
However, these words and stories are also malleable: It is possible to change our 
story, adapt the rules, and be liberated by learning to change the way we judge and 
perceive ourselves.  
Example 2: 
While I primarily work using Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), the first step is to 
create a safe, honest, and trusting relationship that can allow you to share the 
feelings that have become difficult and painful. Once achieved, we will look at the 
specific cognitive and behavioural patterns that are causing problems and may need 
change. 
12 
 
Some clients may need to reach a deeper understanding of the historical social 
context in which they developed difficulties. I also work using Cognitive Analytic 
Therapy (CAT), which involves an initial exploration of experiences with key people in 
your life. This helps us understand how you have learnt to relate to others and 
yourself in particular ways, and identify how these relationship patterns may now be 
holding you back. We then experiment with new ways of relating to yourself and 
others in your current situation. 
Both introductions contain explicit accounts of the respective therapist’s ontological 
and epistemological commitments, and both contain information about their preferred 
model of the person (Example 1 constructs the person as narrator with the potential to 
learn to tell a different story; Example 2 constructs the person as subject to learned patterns 
of behaviour and thinking which have their origin in social contexts of the past and which 
can be replaced with new patterns). Both also construct the process of change as a process 
of learning which, by implication, requires an instructor (that is, the therapist) to facilitate 
this.  
Explicit declarations of ontological and epistemological commitments also occur 
during therapy sessions. Therapists who adopt a more didactic approach to 
psychotherapy/counselling, for example through the use of psychoeducation or theory-
driven interpretations, are likely to use more explicit formulations of their positions than 
therapists who adopt a less openly directive approach. Some models of practice, such as 
cognitive-behavioural therapy or compassion-focused therapy, require the therapist to 
introduce the client to the model and its premises and methods at the beginning of the 
work, and this means that an explicit statement of its ontology and epistemology will have 
13 
 
to be made. However, an explicit declaration of a chosen model’s ontology and 
epistemology does not mean that its status as a model of the person based on a set of 
assumptions is necessarily acknowledged. Rather, the particular assumptions about what it 
means to be human and about how best to develop an understanding of the client’s 
experience are often naturalised and taken to represent the truth about human psychology; 
consequently, the client is encouraged to experience themselves as enlightened about the 
nature of psychological functioning (rather than socialised into a particular vocabulary for 
action).   
 
Implicit positioning 
A therapist’s ontological and epistemological assumptions also inform their practice 
implicitly. Just as researchers need to develop a reflexive awareness of how their ontological 
and epistemological assumptions inform the research questions they are asking and the 
methodological choices they make (Willig, 2012a), therapists need to be aware that the 
questions they ask and the comments they make in a therapy session presuppose and 
reinforce particular versions of human being and experiencing. They also normalise some 
ways of being and experiencing, and problematise others. Even apparently innocuous 
questions designed to simply signal the therapist’s curiosity and open-mindedness always 
contain normative assumptions about human experience and they always imply a model of 
the person. For example, “And how did you feel about that ?” suggests that an emotional 
response is expected in the circumstances (after all, the question does not ask “Did you feel 
something ?” but “How did you feel ?”); it presupposes that it is a response to something in 
particular (“How did you feel about that ?”), and that such a response is of significance or at 
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least of interest (why else ask about it?) The question, therefore, constructs the client as 
someone who ought to have had an emotional response, knows what that response was, is  
able to provide  a suitable label, and recognise its significance. By being asked the question 
and being expected to provide a response to it, the client is gently being socialised into a 
particular ‘vocabulary for action’ (see McNamee, 2004) and a way of relating to themselves 
(in this case, a way of relating that involves expecting oneself to experience emotional 
responses to particular situations or events).  
 
Ontological and epistemological limits to collaboration  
It is worth examining what it means when therapists talk about working ‘collaboratively’ 
with their clients, as this implies a degree of flexibility or fluidity of the therapist’s  
assumptions. A  commitment to collaborative working does nothing to loosen the 
therapist’s ties with their assumptions. References to collaboration can be found across 
models of therapy (Dattilio & Hanna, 2012; Wiseman, Tishy & Barber, 2012; Paré, 2013). 
Collaboration has been described as an important attribute of contemporary 
psychotherapy, characterised by a “respectful, mutual, cooperative relationship” (Kazantis & 
Kellis, 2012, p.133). A collaborative working style has come to be seen as a desirable 
attribute compatible with diverse approaches to psychotherapeutic work. For example, 
within the context of cognitive-behavioural therapy the establishment of common goals in 
treatment and the client’s active involvement in the case formulation of their problems and 
the development of a treatment plan, are presented as evidence of collaboration. Dattilio 
and Hanna (2012) describe CBT’s practice of ‘collaborative empiricism’ (p.146) thus: 
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Collaborative empiricism entails a cooperative effort between therapist and patient in 
devising a treatment plan and incorporates cohesiveness between the patient and the 
therapist as they explore together through discovery and experimentation those 
aspects of the patient that contribute to dysfunction. A number of specific techniques 
employed within this process allow the therapist to help patients to process their 
cognitions, such as identifying automatic thoughts and underlying schemas, address 
regulation of their emotion, and monitor their behavior. This goal is accomplished by 
jointly generating activities and homework assignments to keep the engagement fluid 
between therapy sessions. 
Evidently  collaborative empiricism requires client and therapist to collaborate in the 
application of CBT principles to the client’s material, rather than  in devising the model of 
practice they will be working with. There is no negotiation around whether or not to theorise 
the client’s distress in terms of the effects of automatic thoughts and underlying schemas for 
example, or whether to accept the idea that emotions are the products of cognitive processes.  
This suggests that a commitment to collaborative empiricism still presupposes that the client 
shares the therapist’s assumptions as these underpin their collaborative practice. Dattilio and 
Hanna’s (2012) account of a case study of collaborative working in CBT confirms that a 
commitment to collaborative empiricism does nothing to dislodge the therapist’s loyalty to 
their pre-existing model of the person. Their account of collaboration frames this activity in 
terms of the client being educated about their own psychological processes:  
Even during the initial assessment phase, the collaborative aspect of educating Jason 
to the need for evaluating his symptoms using empirical measures facilitates a basic 
understanding of the severity of his symptoms. The results of such an assessment 
16 
 
will serve as “grist for the therapeutic mill” in setting future agendas in ameliorating 
his symptoms (ibid., p.149) 
And a little later: 
One of the goals in therapy, aside from reducing his panic attacks, involved 
teaching Jason how his learned rigid responses to emotions were limiting his 
ability to not only feel grief and rage but also think deeply about what such loss 
meant to him and what beliefs it evoked (… ).” (ibid., p.150). 
 
This is not unique to CBT. Although other models may not use the language of 
education and their approach to socialising the client into their chosen model’s ‘vocabulary 
for action’ may be more subtle, collaboration in therapy usually requires the client to 
subscribe to the therapist’s model of practice. For example, Wiseman, Tishby and Barber’s 
(2012) account of collaboration in psychodynamic therapy starts by emphasising that 
contemporary relational psychotherapy recognises that the therapist does not own the 
truth about the client, and that client and therapist bring their subjectivities to the process 
of co-constructing meaning together. Citing Safran (2003), they define collaboration as 
follows (Wiseman, Tishby & Barber 2012: 138): 
Collaboration in relational therapy involves the process of co-creation that occurs 
both consciously and unconsciously, which through negotiation leads to new 
meanings. In the ongoing process of negotiation, both patient and therapist 
“struggle to sort out how much they can accommodate to the other’s views about 
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treatment tasks and goals, without compromising themselves in some important 
way (Safran, 2003, p. 439)”. 
 
This sounds as though client and therapist feed into the process of meaning-making 
equally and without the expectation that some meanings are privileged over others. 
However, even here we can identify ontological and epistemological assumptions which 
inform this account of collaboration. There is the assumption that the process of meaning-
making involves ‘conscious’ as well as ‘unconscious’ processes, thus drawing on 
psychoanalytic theory. The psychoanalytic theoretical commitments which underpin the 
approach emerge more clearly later. Wiseman et al. (2012) describe the process by which 
‘enactments’ can act as the vehicle for therapeutic change:  
 
Finally, relational therapy emphasizes the experiencing and working through of 
enactments, which are created within the transference-countertransference matrix. 
Working through an enactment is a collaborative process (Summers & Barber, 2010). 
It is at these moments that the patient’s dynamics come to life (transference), as 
they touch on or trigger emotions and cognitions within the therapist, which, in turn, 
evoke his or her own characteristic interpersonal pattern (countertransference). 
Successful collaboration around enactments entails openness to emotional 
experiencing and self-reflection by both patient and therapist (p.139). 
So, despite the declared commitment to the negotiation and co-creation of 
meanings within a collaborative relationship, the basis upon which such meanings are made 
remains firmly psychoanalytic and is based upon assumptions about psychodynamic 
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processes involving transference-countertransference as well as the role of conscious and 
unconscious material. Clearly, for ‘successful collaboration’ to work, both client and 
therapist need to be open to thinking in these terms and to accept their usefulness, as even 
‘ruptures’ and disagreements between client and therapist are ultimately made sense of on 
the basis of these notions.  Wiseman at al. (2012) write:  
 
A collaborative examination of the dynamics of the interaction between the patient 
and therapist that was played out in the rupture offers participants an opportunity 
to learn in the here-and-now about their respective contributions” (p.138). 
 
So, as we saw in relation to ‘collaborative empiricism’ in CBT, whilst the manner in which 
client and therapist work together may be collaborative, the choice of tools to do the work 
(along with the ontological and epistemological assumption that inform this choice) is not 
the product of collaboration. 
  
Clients’ model of the person 
It is not just the therapist who brings with them views about what it means to be  a person. 
The client’s model of themselves as a person will inform how they present themselves in 
their initial meeting(s) with the therapist. Some clients present themselves as a problem to 
be solved by the therapist. Their conceptualisation of the self is informed by the idea of a 
split self with parts of the self inaccessible to conscious awareness. These clients start the 
therapeutic conversation with the assumption that they are a mystery to themselves and do 
not have access to their motivations, feelings and desires. They may consult a therapist to 
obtain answers to questions such as “Why do I act in the way that I do ?” or  “What is it that 
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I really need ?”.  Within this scenario, the therapist is often positioned as ‘expert’ whilst the 
client offers themselves up for inspection and analysis; within this context the therapist’s 
levels of expertise and skill can become a matter of concern for the client who may question 
the therapist’s competence when answers to their questions are not forthcoming. 
Other clients approach therapy sessions as a sounding board and an opportunity to 
hear themselves think, talk and feel in the presence of a trustworthy and empathic other. 
These clients are not usually overly concerned with the therapist’s technical expertise and 
do not expect answers about what ‘makes them tick’ or what has ‘gone wrong’ with them. 
These clients’ approach to therapy is based on a conceptualisation of the self as 
autonomous and unitary, inhabiting an inner space accessible to them only. Here, the 
therapist is expected to provide time and space for the client to explore this inner space and 
perhaps help them to feel more comfortable within it.  
There are also clients who present themselves as a faulty piece of machinery which 
can be fixed to ensure smooth functioning in the future. Such clients are willing to co-
operate with the therapist but presume that the therapist is equipped with the tools  
required to do the job. The self is conceived as the owner of the faulty piece of machinery 
who is taking responsibility for seeking out expert help to have it repaired. The therapist is 
expected to deliver an appropriate treatment which will solve the problem and restore the 
client’s ability to function. 
A client’s approach to therapy and the therapist may be informed by a combination 
of elements from various constructions of meaning available within their sociocultural 
context. A client’s self-presentation and expectation of the therapist is not necessarily as 
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clear-cut and consistent as suggested by the examples given here. However, all clients hold 
ontological and epistemological assumptions which inform their approach to therapy. 
As is the case in relation to therapists’ introductions to their way of working, clients’ 
assumptions can be gleaned from the way they formulate the reason why they are seeking 
therapeutic input. Take the following email message from a client looking for a suitable 
therapist3: 
I am looking for a counselling professional who can help me overcome my irrational 
fear of travelling on public transport. I would like to make contact with a professional 
who has experience with this particular condition. 
Here, the client is drawing on medical discourse in constructing their experience of 
anxiety as a ‘condition’; the desired therapist is cast as an experienced professional implying 
that they have encountered the symptom (‘irrational fear of travelling on public transport’) 
before and have successfully administered the necessary treatment. The aim of the 
treatment is defined as overcoming an irrational fear, to restore the client’s ability to use 
public transport. At the same time, the client is positioning him/herself as an active agent 
who is seeking assistance to solve a problem for which s/he is taking responsibility. Thus, in 
this brief email the client sets out their implicit ‘model of the person’ and maps out 
positions for him/herself and the therapist within this context. Consider this alternative 
formulation of the request for therapeutic input: 
                                                          
3 The two emails used as examples here are composites of similar emails I have received and 
do not constitute reproductions of any particular client’s emails. 
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I have been experiencing intense feelings of anxiety when travelling on public 
transport for some time now and feel that I need to talk to someone about this. I 
want to understand what this is about   
Here, the client constructs their experience of anxiety as something potentially 
meaningful, and  assumes that talking about it within the context of counselling sessions will 
allow him/her to reach an understanding of the meaning of the experience. S/he constructs 
the desire to understand her experience as a need. The desired therapist is referred to as 
‘someone to talk to’ thus foregrounding their humanity and personhood rather than their 
professional status. Again, we can see that the client’s formulation of their request for 
therapeutic input mobilises a particular way of constructing the person who will be engaged 
in therapy and positions both client and therapist in relation to this.  
Implications for Practice  
The ‘authoring’ of our own and others’ selves through dialogue is an ethically charged act 
(Sullivan, 2007, p.110). It is important, therefore, to acknowledge that through our work as 
therapists we co-construct what it means to be a person rather than simply discover or 
uncover pre-existing ‘selves’.  Our activities contribute to the shaping of the modern self and 
this carries an ethical responsibility (Gergen, 1973; Furedi, 2004). It is all too easy to subtly 
encourage a client to construct a particular kind of self, through our questions and 
responses, and then to feel as though we have discovered something that has been there all 
along. The therapist’s model of the person can be imposed upon the client who is presented 
with ‘evidence’ of this self as it is produced in the course of the session. For example, the 
choice of active versus passive voice in the formulation of a question can make room for 
22 
 
different kinds of selves to step in. Consider the difference, for instance, between asking “So 
what made you do that ?” and “Why did you do that ?”.   
To encourage reflexive awareness of our own ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, and the ways in which they encourage the production of particular kinds of 
selves in conversations with clients, we need to engage in careful scrutiny of our own taken-
for-granted notions and ways of making sense of what people do and say. One way of 
accessing and reflecting on one’s assumptions is to conduct reflexive interviews during 
which the participants take turns in asking one another to reflect on questions such as 
these: 
 
1. How do you know that you know something about a person? 
2. Is it possible to find out why someone did something? If so, how? 
3. What motivates people to act the way they do? 
4. To what extent can people know themselves? And what does it mean to know 
oneself? 
5. What are your beliefs about human nature, and what is the evidence in support of 
these? 
6. What is the role of language in arriving at an understanding of oneself and others? 
Listening to recordings of one’s responses to these questions can be very revealing. The 
realisation that we hold quite specific and strong beliefs about human being and 
experiencing can come as a surprise, especially to those of us who like to think of ourselves 
as person-centred and collaborative  
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Another way of facilitating ontological and epistemological reflexivity involves the use of 
discourse analytic methods to raise awareness of the ways in which language constructs 
different versions of social reality and experience. The identification of discursive 
constructions, discursive strategies and available subject positions that characterise relevant 
textual material (for instance, transcripts of therapy sessions; descriptions of therapeutic 
models; manualised therapy materials) helps shed light on the ways in which particular 
versions of mental health/distress are talked and written into being (Parker, Georgaca, 
Harper, McLaughlin & Stowell-Smith, 1995; Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2013). This approach 
has been advocated as a tool to develop reflexivity in both training and supervision contexts 
(McKenzie & Monk, 1997; Heenan, 1997) and used in research examining the process by 
which (preferred) meanings are constructed during therapy sessions (Kogan, 1008; Kogan & 
Gale, 1997; Frosh et al., 1996; Stancombe & White, 2005).  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that ontological and epistemological reflexivity constitute 
neglected dimensions of self-knowledge within the field of counselling and psychotherapy, 
and proposed that such reflexivity ought to be considered a core skill for therapists. My 
recommendations are based on the premise that making assumptions about what it means 
to be a person is inevitable and forms the basis of our relating to other people including our 
clients. Even post-modern perspectives which challenge the notion of the unitary, rational 
subject (Henriques at al., 1998), conceptualising human subjectivity as polyvocal and 
characterised by a multiplicity of possible ‘selves’ which can emerge in different contexts 
(Gergen, 1999)are based upon  assumptions (in this case, assumptions about the 
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fundamentally social nature of human being and experience, the role of language in 
constituting human ‘selves’ and the assumption that studying discourse provides us with 
insights into the construction of personhood). Holding views about the nature and meaning 
of human being and experiencing is not the problem; we are not concerned here with 
reflexivity as a means of removing bias. Rather, ontological and epistemological reflexivity 
helps us to recognise the content of the assumptions which underpin our way of relating to 
another person and remind us that our own assumptions about human being and 
experiencing are just that- assumptions.   
 
Concluding reflections on my own practice 
In the spirit of this paper’s concern with reflexivity and transparency, I want to end with 
some reflections on where my own epistemological and ontological positions take me in 
relation to my work with clients.  Sullivan’s (2010) proposal that we incorporate the self-self 
relationship into our studies of experience resonates with my own model of the person. 
Writing about qualitative research in psychology, Sullivan (2010) draws attention to the fact 
that rather than presenting us with straightforward accounts of experience, research 
participants themselves bring an attitude of hermeneutic suspicion to their own experience: 
They are not just subjects to be known but also selves as knowers- introspectionists 
who alter the content of their own experience by its observation- and who are 
capable of interpreting and re-interpreting what they had trusted as being suspicious 
and vice versa.” (p.14) 
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I have been struck by the extent to which my clients question their motives, express 
uncertainty about the true nature of their feelings and offer possible interpretations of their 
actions; which often includes their reactions to other people’s interpretations. As a therapist 
I have witnessed this struggle for meaning through which selves are made and I am aware of 
having contributed to it by offering meanings and self-positions through my questions and 
comments.  
However, it has become clear that even though the desire to arrive at definitive 
answers about who we are and what we need can be very strong, ultimately any final 
meaning tends to be resisted because to accept a final meaning would mean to silence the 
“I”, the part of the self that is the “seat of perception and ground for action”  (Holquist, 
1990: xxxix, cited in Sullivan, 2007: 112), and that is engaged in the process of questioning 
and reflecting.  
Indeed, Lysaker and Lysaker (2002) suggest that psychotic states are characterised by 
disruptions in the dialogical self and that the loss of the ability to maintain an ongoing 
dialogue within the self, undermines our basic sense of self. Paradoxically, then, it may not 
be a fixed set of physical and psychological qualities, features and characteristics that 
provides us with a stable sense of self, but the ability to hold an inner dialogue about who 
we might be, and to maintain an active self-self relationship, that gives us a sense of 
coherence and unity.  
These reflections have led me to conclude that perhaps what really matters is 
process, not content; any interpretations that I, as a therapist, may offer, function only as 
reference points, as possible self-positions with which my clients may engage as they reflect 
on what it means to be human. Perhaps the most important thing I can do for my clients is 
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facilitate communication between self-positions, to nurture my clients’ dialogical self, by 
providing resources for internal dialogue through external dialogue. My ontological and 
epistemological reflexivity is an important part of this process as it facilitates the recognition 
of my assumptions as assumptions and for this to be made explicit during the sessions. This 
enables the client to develop their own relationship with these assumptions during the 
course of our therapeutic work together.  
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